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Abstract. This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided
matching model where agents have single peaked preferences and face no costs or restrictions to matching.
These algorithms allow matches to be computed as an explicit function of the parameters of the model,
making them convenient for use in theoretical matching market models, such as dating markets. One such
theoretical model is solved and analyzed. Finally, several possible extensions and topics for further study
are explored, such as adding noise to observed types and allowing misreporting of type.
1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to establish tractable stable matching algorithms for a two sided single period
matching model with continuous distributions of agents over a single parameter type and nontransferable
utility. Further, these agents can freely propose matches to any agent on the opposing side and have strictly
single-peaked preferences. By tractable, I mean that, for each agent on one side, their set of possible
(indiﬀerent) matches can be computed directly from the type of the agent and the parameters of the model
(e.g. preferences and distributions of agents) without recourse to iterative, highly computational algorithms.
Thus, these algorithms should be convenient for use in theoretical matching market models.
Examples of appropriate models for such an algorithm is are the highly researched dating and marriage
markets. While many dating models use horizontal preferences, single peaked preferences allow for the
exploration of matching on characteristics like age, cultural background, ethnicity, hobbies, personality type,
and life goals, for which there are no universal ordinal rankings and where the distributions may not be
identical for both sides. Also, in online dating platforms agents can use search ﬁlters or the platform's
matching algorithm to choose compatible type individuals out of the entire distribution at virtually no cost,
justifying the use of a model where agents choose from the entire distribution rather than, say, a ﬁnite
random draw from that distribution.
This paper follows a rich literature on stable matching problems, starting with the seminal paper by Gale
and Shapley [5], which introduced an algorithm for deriving stable matches given arbitrary preferences and
a ﬁnite set of agents. While this algorithm is highly general, it utilizes an iterative process that must be
run before matches can be derived. Thus, while it is quite useful for empirical analysis, it does not lend
itself to being embedded in a theoretical model. Becker [1] found that positive assortative matching occurs
when there is a continuum of types and the utility of a match is increasing in types and nontransferablethat
is, when the two matching agents can't bargain over the apportionment of the utility of the matchand
that assortative matching also occurs when utility is transferable and the total utility of a match exhibits
increasing diﬀerences in the two agents' types. Unlike Gale-Shapley, this requires no iterative process to
pair up agents, so it is suitable for use in theoretical models, but the fairly onerous restriction of vertical
preferenceshigher types are universally preferred to lower typeslimits its application. Legros and Newman
[6] extended positive and negative assortative matching results to a class of partially nontransferable utility
problems, where there are limitations on the ability of some or all agents to transfer utility to their match.
Assuming horizontal preferences where agents want to match to their own type rather than the vertical
preferences of Becker, Clark (2003) [2] gives an algorithm for ﬁnding stable matchings in a market with a
ﬁnite set of agents. Clark (2007) [4] then treats the horizontal case with an inﬁnite set of agents, ﬁnding a
very simple matching result. Clark (2006) [3] also gives a condition guaranteeing a unique stable matching.
Klumpp [7] derives a very simple inside-out algorithm for horizontal matching with ﬁnitely many agents.
1
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Figure 2.1. Initial distributions A and B of agents over type θ. There is an area of overlap
in the center where, for any type in the overlap, both distributions have at least as much
mass as the overlapped region.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 demonstrates Clark's matching algorithm for
the simplest case where preferences are homophilicthat is, where the peak preference is the agent's own type.
Section 3 generalizes the model by allow agents to have arbitrary single peaked preferences, and matching
algorithms are derived given some additional assumptions. Section 4 relates the single-peaked matching
result to the horizontal and vertical preference literature. Section 5 provides interpretation for the results
and empirical implications. Section 6.1 sets up a simple dating platform model and section 6.2 solves it using
vertical preferences and then solves a generalization of it the single-peaked preferences algorithm. Section
6.3 provides analysis of models and contrasts them. Finally, the concluding section describes directions for
further study.
2. Model with homophilic preferences
2.1. Baseline Model1. Before we address more general single peaked preferences, it is instructive to review
the horizontal preference matching algorithm ﬁrst derived in Clark 2007 [4]. Consider a two sided matching
model with two continuous, integrable distributions A and B over a shared univariate typespace Θ, with A
and B representing the masses of agents on each side. Denote an agent i from the mass of agents of type θ
on side S siθ, sθ if supressing the index is appropriate. Let preferences be strictly single peaked. That is,
an agent s with peak preference θpeak for θ1, θ2 < θpeak, if θpeak − θ1 > θpeak − θ2 then s1 ≺
s
s2, and for
θ1, θ2 > θpeak, if θ1 − θpeak > θ2 − θpeak then s1 ≺
s
s2. Suppose ∀ agents siθ, θpeak = θ that is, agents have
homophilic preferences. Suppose further that agents face no search costs or other limitations to matching,
i.e. suppose agents optimize over the entire set of agents who are willing to match to them. Note that,
while we can normalize either A or B to measure 1 without loss of generality, making both measure 1 is a
simplifying assumption, requiring an equal mass of agents on each side. We will proceed for now using this
assumption as it simpliﬁes the problem, and relax it later.
• Assumption 1 (MASS) : Suppose an equal measure of agents on each side.
This scenario aﬀords an extremely simple solution. First, we match and remove from consideration the area
under both curves, if such an area exists.
Lemma 1. For each type θ, a measure µθ = min(µθA, µθB) of θ agents on side A (B) matches to θ types
on side B (A), where µθS is the mass of agents of type θ on side S.
Proof. There are at least µθ agents of type θ on each side by deﬁnition. Since preferences are homophilic,
aiθ strictly prefers bjθ to any agent bks, and symmetrically biθ prefers ajθ to any aks. Then a mass µθ of
aθ's will strictly prefer to match with any of the measure µθ of bθ's, and the bθ's will symmetrically strictly
prefer aθ's to any other agents, so they will form stable matches. 
1I derived these horizontal results independently, being unaware of Clark's unpublished paper. However I believe the
derivation is a good motivation for the later, novel result, so I have retained this section.
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Figure 2.2. The remainder distributions A′.and B
′
that are left when the mass of over-
lapping agents is matched and removed from the market.
Now we can eliminate the stably matched overlap agents from consideration. The remainder distributions
can be deﬁned as
fA′ (θ) = max{
fA(θ)− fB(θ)´
Θ
max{(fA(θ)− fB(θ), 0} dθ , 0}
and
fB′ (θ) = max{
fB(θ)− fA(θ)´
Θ
max{(fB(θ)− fA(θ), 0} dθ , 0}
where the integral ensures a well-deﬁned probability density function with mass 1. Note that the area under
both A and B is the same for both distributions, so the scalar they must be multiplied by is also the same
and we don't have any issues of miscounting the measures of agents on each side. Deﬁne A' and B' as the
distributions with these respective densities.
We now inductively derive a very simple matching algorithm that yields the type s of the match bjs for
aiθ (ajs for biθ) as an explicit function depending only on the remainder distributions and aiθ (biθ). The
intuition here is that we start at the far right of the left remainder distribution (A in this example) and
the far left of the right distribution (B in this example), or on other words the innermost points of each
distribution, and then iteratively match outward, with the current (innermost remaining) matchers taking
the already stably matched interior agents as unavailable. Because agents want the closest match possible,
the current matchers on each side strictly prefer the current (innermost remaining) matchers on the other
side to anyone else, so they match and the process continues. Note that, because matching is one-to-one,
the measure of agents who have been matched on one side must equal the measure of agents who have been
matched on the other. Before we complete this proof, we make two additional assumptions.
• Assumption 2 (SEP): Suppose the probability density functions have the single crossing property
i.e. the probability density functions intersect at only one point.
• Assumption 3 (OUT): Suppose that agents prefer any match to no match.
Like MASS, SEP and OUT are not necessary for a tractable answer, but they allow for a very simple baseline
result to be derived, against which deviations from these assumptions can later be compared.
Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, assume A
′
is to the left of B
′
. Suppose that all agents in the interval
(θA, θB) have been stably matched and are eliminated from consideration, while no other agents in A
′
or B
′
have matched. Then a mass of agents min{fA(θA), fB(θB)} of types θAand θB will match stably.
Proof. We know aiθA prefers bjθB to any other bkθ and vice versa, as they are mutually distance-minimal
among the set of remaining potential matches, and all agents that have already been matched are closer
to their match then they are to any remaining potential match by construction, so they will not prefer to
deviate to one of the current matchers. Thus the agents will match stably, as was to be shown. 
We are now ready to present the algorithm and prove its validity.
Proposition 3. (Homophilic Matching) Suppose MASS, SEP, and OUT . A measure of agents equal to the
measure under both curves and with equal density over θ will match to their own type. For all remaining
agents of all types θ, θA agents match to agents of type F
−1
B (1− FA(θA)) and θB agents match to agents of
type F−1A (1− FB(θB)).
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Figure 2.3. The stage in the matching process when types θA and θB are the innermost
unmatched types. Note that the darkened areas that have already been matched are of
equal mass and θA and θBare mutually closest to one another among the remaining agents.
Proof. The ﬁrst portion of Proposition 3 is simply Lemma 1. The second is obtained by inductively applying
Lemma 2 starting at the innermost points on the two remainder distributions and moving outwards, and by
using the fact that the measures of agents matched on each side, 1− FA(θA) for A and FB(θB) for B, must
be equal. 
2.2. Extensions to the Baseline Model. To get the result above, we made three fairly restrictive as-
sumptions. We will now relax them and ﬁnd the matching outcome in the more general cases. The matching
algorithm is remains quite simple, although relaxing SEP will require a new assumption.
MASS sets the measure of agents on each side of the matching market equal. This is a reasonable
assumption in the broader heterosexual dating market, for example, where it is approximately true. However,
if one wants to model, say, online dating platforms that attract men and women in disproportionate numbers,
or the marriage market in countries that have a signiﬁcant deﬁcit of men due to war or women due to sex
selective abortions, then MASS must be abandoned. All this will do is leave the outermost agents of the
larger side unmatched, as the supply of agents on the other side will have run out. Speciﬁcally, without loss
of generality suppose µB > µA and A is to the left of B. Then the rightmost µB − µA B agentsthat is, B
agents to the right of θB = F
−1
B (µB − µA) will be unmatched, while the rest will match as before.
Figure 2.4. Matching with unbalanced distributions. Here B has more mass than A, so
the furthest (least attractive) B agents do not receive a match unless they are matched in
stage one, the overlap matching phase.
SEP ensures that all agents of one distribution are above or below all agents of the other. If this does
not hold, we may have a situation like Figure 2.5 where some A agents are above all B agents and some
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A agents are below all B agents, and of course much more complicated situations of the same nature could
occur. In order to ﬁnd the matching here, we need to be able to relate preferences for types on the left of
the agent to preferences for types to the right of the right of the agent. Assuming we have a utility function
or some other means to compare potential matches to the left and right, we can ﬁnd cutoﬀ agents who are
indiﬀerent between their best available match on the right and left. In some cases we can proceed as before
from the innermost points on each pair of adjacent islands in the two distributions, with indiﬀerent agents
determining cutoﬀs where agents switch from the available match on one side to the match on the other.
However, we may run into situations where agents in one island match to agents in a nonadjacent island.
This is not the primary focus of this paper, so we will not explore this issue any further.
Figure 2.5. Matching without the single crossing propertythe remainder of A is separated
into two islands, with the remainder of B in the middle. B agents to the left of the dotted
line will match to the left A island, while B agents to the right will match to the right island.
OUT requires that all agents accept whatever the best match available to them is. However the most
obvious qualitative characteristic of the matching outcome in this model is that, for the agents of types that
are overrepresented relative to that type on the other side, the non-perfect matches quickly deteriorate in
quality for fringe agents, as the best remaining match moves further away from them the further to the outside
they are. The outermost agents will in fact get their worst possible match, so it seems reasonable that at a
certain point agents will prefer no match to a terrible one. The result of dropping OUT , assuming that the
reservation distance is the same for all types, is simply that matching will terminate once the distance between
the innermost remaining agents is equal to the reservation distance, with the rest remaining unmatched.
Figure 2.6. Matching when agents have the option to refuse. Agents beyond the distance
where the cutoﬀ agents are indiﬀerent between matching or staying single do not clear the
matching market.
3. Generalization to arbitrary single peaked preferences
3.1. Baseline Model. We now allow agent type and agent preference to vary independently, generalizing
to arbitrary single peaked preferences. This allows agents to prefer types other than their own. For example,
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men may prefer women of a diﬀerent level of femininity than their own, or may prefer someone of a comple-
mentary disposition to make up for their shortcomings. Also, two individuals with the same characteristics
may have diﬀerent preferences over their match's characteristics, rather than e.g. a man's height uniquely
determining his height preference. Note that, since the type of an individual is now a pair of the form
(characteristic, peak preference), so if we continue using the term type for an agent's characteristic, we
introduce ambiguity. For that reason, an agent's characteristic (e.g. height, BMI, etc.) will now be referred
to as their trait.
Figure 3.1. Contour plot of the trait/preference distribution A. An A agent's trait runs
along the vertical axis and its peak preference over the traits of potential matches runs along
the horizontal axis. Darker colors indicate greater mass.
Now that agents have two characteristics, the set of agents on a given side is a bivariate distribution
over own trait and peak preference. Denote an agent i with trait θ and peak preference p as siθp. Trait in
this situation is the sole characteristic over which an agent's potential matches have preferences, while peak
preference determines that agent's most preferred match. To facilitate easy visualization of the algorithm to
be derived, we will overlay the distributions A and B, ﬂipping the axes for B. This will put A agent traits
and B agent peak preferences on the vertical axis, and B agent traits and A agent peak preferences on the
horizontal axis.
The reason for representing the distributions like this is that A agents evaluate matches based on the
distance between their preference and a B agent's trait, which is now the horizontal distance between aiθp
and bjsn on our graph, and B agents evaluate matches based on the distance between their preference and
an A agent's trait, which is now the vertical distance between aiθp and bjsn, so we can use the graph to
easily compare agent preferences over potential matches.
In general, this is a more complicated problem, and no simple formula of great generality will be oﬀered
in this paper The agents under both distributions still match to their preferred traits, but the agents in the
remainder distributions are more diﬃcult to deal with. Whether a more general simple solution is possible
is a topic for further study. However, under speciﬁc assumptions on the distributions, the problem is still
very tractable. First, we'll make the same assumptions as in Section II, with a slight variation to account for
the more general environment. Speciﬁcally, we keep MASS and OUT as is and add the following amended
assumption:
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Figure 3.2. Overlaid contour plots of distributions A (teal) and B (purple). Darker teal
areas indicate more mass in A, and darker purple areas indicate more mass in B.
Figure 3.3. Comparing matches graphically using the overlay. As shown above, the vertical
and horizontal distances between an A and a B agent on this representation tell us the agents'
preferences for each other.
• Assumption 2' (SEP') : Deﬁne h(x) = y all ∀(x, y) ∈ s. Suppose the remainder distributions A'
and B' are separated by a single curve s. That is, ∀x and ∀y′ > h(x), (x,y') has support only on A
for all y' or only on B for all y', and ∀y′ < h(x), the only the opposite distribution has support at
(x,y').
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As before, this ensures no complications due to multimodal distributions, varying tail weights, or ﬂat areas
between the remainder distributions. Further suﬃcient but not necessary conditions for a simple solution
are as follows:
• Assumption 4(CURVE1, CURVE2):
 h is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in x.
 the marginal density of A at preference x equals the marginal density of B at preference y for
(x, y) ∈ s.That is, fAX(x) = fBY (y).
Figure 3.4. Matching from the southwest to the northeast on the remainder distributions
of A and B. B agents of trait x match to A agents of trait y, regardless of peak preference.
Under these conditions, the matching of the remainder distributions can be solved by matching in an unzip-
ping fashion, where at any stage of the matching process the agents in the southwest (southeast) quadrant
of the graph below and to the left (right) of some (x, y) on s have all matched (analogous to the interval
which has already matched in the homophilic case), while no one else has, and the agents of interest are
those on the edges of the quadrant (analogous to the innermost remaining types in the homophilic case).
First, we eliminate the overlapping agents, as before.
Lemma 4. For each point (x, y), a measure of agents on side A(B) equal to µ(x, y) = min{fA(x, y), fB(y, x)},
matches to the types on side B(A) with transposed θ and p.
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 1, there are at least µθp (θ, p) A agents and (p, θ) B agents by deﬁnition. Since
preferences are homophilic, aiθp weakly prefers bjpθ to any other B agent, and symmetrically bipθ prefers ajθp
to any other A agent. Then a mass µθ of aθ's will weakly prefer to match with any of the measure µθ of bθ's,
and the bθ's will symmetrically strictly prefer aθ's to any other agents, so they will form stable matches. 
Note that in this case the matching outcome described here may not be the only one possible, since agents
don't strictly prefer their mirror agent over agents with their ideal trait but a preference for someone other
than them This can be resolved by using lexicographic preferences where preference over θ are as before
and, if two potential matches have the same θ, agents prefer matches whose preferences are closer to their
own trait, with the rationale that, if someone likes you better, your relationship with them will generally
be better. This gives an outcome where agents of a given trait match assortatively in preference (this is an
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element of the set of outcomes deﬁned in proposition 6), but complicates the solution in the more generalized
case in section 3.2, so we will not make this assumption and simply note that there may be other possible
stable matchings.
We now construct the remainder distributions. Deﬁne
fA′ (θ, p) = max{
fA(θ, p)− fB(p, θ)´
p
´
θ
(max{fA(θ, p)− fB(p, θ), 0}) dθdp , 0}
and
fB′ (θ, p) = max{
fB(θ, p)− fA(p, θ)´
p
´
θ
(max{fB(θ, p)− fA(p, θ), 0}) dθdp , 0}
We are now ready to prove the inductive lemma for this case:
Lemma 5. Without loss of generality assume A
′
is to the northwest of B
′
(separated by a curve as per SEP').
Suppose that all agents with traits and preferences such that (x, y) < (x∗, y∗) have been stably matched and
are eliminated from consideration, while no other agents in A
′
or B
′
have matched. Then the set of A′
agents {aiθp : θ = y∗} will match stably and arbitrarily to the set of B′ agents {biθp : θ = x∗}.
Proof. For each B agent bx∗n, n ≤ y∗, which is the trait of all A agents on the other edge of the quadrant
deﬁned by (x, y), so ay∗p

bx∗m
aθp, ∀ unmatched agents aθp where as θ > y∗. A symmetric argument
shows that all ay∗p strictly prefer bx∗n agents to any other unmatched B agents, so the edge agents of both
distributions will match to one another. Since fAX(x) = fBY (y), these sets of agents have equal measure,
so they exactly and stably match to one another, leaving no remaining bx∗n or ay∗p. 
Proposition 6. (Single Peaked Two-sided Matching I) Suppose MASS, SEP ′, OUT , and CURV E. A
measure of agents equal to the measure under both distributions and with equal density over (x, y) will match
to their preferred type, which also ﬁnds them optimal. For agents in the remainder distributions A
′
and B
′
and for all (x, y) ∈ s, the set of A′ agents {aθp : θ = y} will match stably and arbitrarily to the set of B′
agents {bθp : θ = x}.
Proof. The ﬁrst result is simply Lemma 1. Inductively proceeding with Lemma 2 northeast along s, we have
that ayp matches with any bxn and vice versa ∀(x, y) ∈ s. Because the marginal densities are equal along
this path, the measure of matched agents at any point in the inductive process is identical for both sides, so
we don't violate the necessary condition of 1− 1 matching. 
It's worth noting that this marginal density assumption is very important. If we did not have CURV E2
and tried to proceed as above, we'd have unequal measures of agents being matched at various points in the
matching process, a clear contradiction. In fact, what would happen is that each layer of A′ agents would
not completely match out the corresponding layer of B′ agents, and the remaining B′ agents would match
to the next layer of A′ agents. We would then no longer be in the the extremely convenient situation where
the current matchers are all of one trait and where every current matcher prefers the edge agents on the
other side to any other available agent. Similarly, dropping CURVE1 would invalidate the procedure, with,
for example, agents on one side matching to no one on the other side when the slope of s was negative.
We can also obtain an algorithm for the matching in a one-sided problem with single-peaked preferences
from the two-sided algorithm by representing the one-sided problem as a two sided problem. Recall that a
one-sided matching problem is one where there is a single set of agents who must be matched to one another
in any way that satisﬁes stability, whereas the two sided problem imposes the additional constraint that
agents can only match to individuals on the opposite side.
Corollary 7. (Single Peaked One-sided Matching) For any distributionf(p, θ), deﬁne fA(p, θ) = fB(p, θ) =
f(p, θ). Then if fAand fB satisfy MASS, SEP
′, OUT , and CURV E and s = (x, x)∀x ∈ R , Proposition
6 holds. Equivalently, the one-sided matching problem with distribution f has the stable matching given by
Proposition 6, where the match of a given agent a(b) is inf rather than fB(fA).
Proof. The ﬁrst claim follows directly from Proposition 6, as it is just a special case of the problem considered
there. For the second claim, consider the one-sided matching problem with single peaked preferences and
distribution f . An agent a with trait θa and preference pa prefers matches b based on . Similarly, b prefers
matches based on|pb− θa|. Then if we overlay fA = f with an axes-transposed copy of f , fB , a's preferences
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over f are given by the vertical distance, and b's preferences over f are given by the horizontal distance.
First, we remove agents with perfect matches, so a mass min(f(p, θ), f(θ, p)) is matched to its ideal match
for each (θ, p), then we move on to the iterative stage. f, at every stage of the matching process, the set
of unmatched agents on each side in the two-sided problem is equal to the set of unmatched agents in the
one-sided problem, where all the matches thus far derived in the two-sided problem are stable in the one
sided problem, then the current matches are optimal among the set of available matches for all agents on
both sides, so they are optimal in the one-sided problem. There is one complication herewhen agent a
is matched to agent b in the two-sided problem, the a is removed from side A and b is removed from side
B. However, in the one-sided problem both a and b are on the same side. If some matched agents are not
removed from each side, the set of available matches will not correspond to the one-sided problem. However,
because the distributions are identical, the remainder distributions are also identical by their deﬁnitions,
and x = y ∀(x, y) ∈ s, the set of current matches is identical, and agents are indiﬀerent between all possible
matches in this set. Since there are inﬁnitely many agents at every point with nonzero support, we can
always have half the agents of a given type match to the other half, leaving no agents unmatched and all
agents with their preference maximal match among the set of remaining agents.
Note that this yields a very simple matching outcome where as many agents get perfect matches as
possibly can and the remainder match to their own trait (positive assortation). 
3.2. Extensions to the Baseline Model. While the result in 3.1 is extremely simple, the assumptions,
especially CURVE2, are unlikely to be even approximately satisﬁed in a real world application. Having the
marginal densities equal at any particular point on s is unlikely, much less at every point. First, then, we will
relax this assumption. This signiﬁcantly complicates the problem, but does not render it insoluble. Without
loss of generality, assume that A and B are separated by a monotonically decreasing h, with A above and to
the right and B below and to the left. First, ﬁnd all points (xi, yi) ∈ s such that 1 − FB′Y (yi) = FA′X(xi)
for i ∈ {1, ..., n} (assume there are ﬁnitely many such points). Then, ∀(x, y) ∈ s where (xi, yi) 5 (x, y) 5
(xi+1, yi+1), (xn, yn) 5 (x, y), or (x, y) 5 (x1, y1),1−FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) or 1−FB′Y (y) = FA′X(x). Without
loss of generality, suppose 1 − FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x). Then, with the following amended assumption, we can
proceed to a matching solution.
• Assumption 4' (CURVE2'):
 When A′(B′) has a larger mass matched out, the marginal density of A′(B′) at trait x(y) is
greater than or equal to the marginal density of B′(A′) at trait y(x) for preferences greater than
or equal to y(x), where y(x) is such that we have masses ma = mb1 +mb2 (mb = ma1 +ma2).
That is, fA′X(x) =
´∞
y
fB′(x, p)dp (fB′Y (y) =
´ x
−∞ fA(y, p)dp), .
This assumption ensures that there is never more mass in β1 in Figure 3.5 than in α, which would invalidate
the matching algorithm since, as x moved outward as the matching progressed down and to the right, more
mass would be matched in B than in A, even if y didn't decrease at all.
Finally, before we state the proposition, we'll need a deﬁnition and two equations.
Deﬁnition 8. DeﬁneMA(x) as the set of B agents that an A agent of trait x can stably match to. That is.
MA(x) = {bjθp : θ = y} ∩ {bjθp : p = x ∧ θ = y}. Similarly, MB(y) = {ajθp : θ = x} ∩ {ajθp : p = y ∧ θ 5 x}.
We also deﬁne two equations guaranteeing equal masses of agents have been matched out at each step
(this is equivalent to the equal masses condition in CURVE2').
(3.1)
∞ˆ
−∞
xˆ
−∞y
fA′(θ, p)dθdp =
xˆ
−∞
∞ˆ
y
fB′(θ, p)dθdp
(3.2)
∞ˆ
−∞
∞ˆ
y
fB′(θ, p)dθdp =
∞ˆ
y
xˆ
−∞
fA′(θ, p)dθdp
Proposition 9. (Single Peaked Two-sided Matching II) Suppose MASS, SEP ′, OUT , and CURV E′. A
measure of agents equal to the measure under both distributions and with equal density over (x, y) will match
to their converse type, who also ﬁnds them optimal. For agents in the remainder distributions A
′
and B
′
and for all (x, y) ∈ s, if 1− FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) A′ agents {aiθp : θ = x} will match stably and arbitrarily to
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elements of the set of B′ agents MA(x) and vice versa, where y satisﬁes Eqn. 3.1 If 1−FB′Y (y) > FA′X(x)
B′ agents {biθp : θ = y} will match stably and arbitrarily to elements of the set of A′ agents MB(y) and vice
versa, where x satisﬁes Eqn. 3.2.
Proof. Then A agents of trait x will match to b agents of trait y and p 5 x or b agents whereh−1(x) 5 p 5 y
and trait x. To check that this is stable, consider a1, b1 and a2, b2 matching this way, where x2 > x1and
consequently y2 < y1 . Without loss of generality, either (1) 1 − FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for both 1 and 2, or
(2)1−FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for pair 1 and not for pair 2. If (1), a1 b1 a2 since pb1 5 θa1 < θa2 . Then we need
only consider the potential a1 − b2 blocking pair. a1 b2 a2 only if pb2 < θa2 , else a2 is b2's perfect match.
But if so then the trait of b2 is y2. Then b1 a1 b2 as y2 < θb1 < pa1 . If (2), b1 a1 b2 since pa1 > θb1 > θb2
and a1 b1 a2as pb1 = θa1 > θa2 , so there is no blocking pair. Finally, if both pairs come from the same stage
in the matching algorithm, either the b's are indiﬀerent between the a's or the a's are indiﬀerent between
the b's, so there is no blocking pair. 
Figure 3.5. Matching with unequal marginal distributions. A has more mass in ma than
B has in mb1, so agents in mb2 have also been matched to equalize the mass on both sides.
4. Relationship to the Literature
As mentioned previously, there are well known results for two-sided matching with vertical preferences,
and Clark 2007[4] gives the results for horizontal preferences shown in section 2. It is obvious from the
previous exposition that horizontal preferences are a special case of single-peaked preferencesspeciﬁcally,
they are the case where preference is set equal to trait. Then with these preferences, we should ﬁnd that
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Figure 3.6. Proposition 8, case 1 example: 1− FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for both(x1, y1) and (x2, y2).
the single peaked algorithm reduces to the horizontal preference algorithm. In fact this is the case. In the
horizontal preference case, the distributions have support only on the diagonal, where preference equals trait.
From here, we remove the overlap and can now easily draw a monotonically decreasing curve s = (x, h(x))
that separates the two sides, and by letting h(x) =F−1B (1 − FA(x)), we have the appropriate matches and
an equal mass of matched out agents at every step in the process, as desired.
Similarly, Becker's NTU model with vertical preferences is also a special case of single-peaked preferences,
namely, when everyone's preference is for higher traits. If there is a maximal trait θ¯, we can simply set
preferences to θ¯. This aﬀords a simple graphical representation, with the distributions varying along trait with
support only at preference θ¯. Choosings = (x, h(x)) and letting h(x) =F−1B (FA(x)), we have the appropriate
matches and an equal mass of matched out agents at every step in the process and the two distributions
are separated by s, and we have the familiar positive assortative matching for vertical preferences with
nontransferable utility.
5. Interpretation and Empirical Implications
5.1. Interpretation. These models are amenable to some interpretation. While in the vertical case we have
positively assortative matching (PAM), and in the horizontal case we have PAM in the overlap and negativly
assortative matching (NAM) in the remainders, in the equal-marginals case of single peaked preferences,
we have two modes of matching that encompass these previous cases. First, we have a converse form of
PAM over trait and preference in the overlap region, where we have positive assortation in A trait and B
preference and in B trait and A preferencethat is, increase in one parameter corresponds to increase in the
other parameter in one's match. Note that this is more than just PAMthe matches have exactly reversed
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Figure 3.7. Proposition 8, case 2 example: 1− FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for (x1, y1) only.
trait and preference. We can also see that the standard PAM of the horizontal model is actually a special
case of this converse PAM, where only the fact that trait and preference are equal ensures that A trait equals
B trait. For the remainders, we have either PAM in trait only (not in preference) if the separating curve s has
a positive slope, and NAM in trait only if s has a negative slope. This again corresponds to the horizontal
and vertical cases, with the line in the vertical case having a positive slope, while the horizontal case has a
negative slope.
The more general model of proposition 8 is a bit more complicated, but also yields an intuitive interpre-
tation. Without loss of generality, assume a strictly decreasing h and A at the top right, with higher mass
on side A as in ﬁgure 3.5. In this situation, B agents can be thought of as being in shortage at (x, h−1(x))
in ﬁgure 3.5, as there aren't enough of them to match to A agents as in the equal marginals outcome. As
such, and given that matching utilities for each agent in a match need not correlate in any way, we'd expect
that B agents will often be able to leverage this scarcity to get a matching outcome more favorable to their
side, and this is in fact the case. Notice that the entire region β1 in ﬁgure 3.5 gets perfect matches (from
their perspective), while β2 agents have a similar matching outcome to B agents in the equal marginals
case. A agents, on the other hand, match to B agents whose trait is further from their preferences than
the agents with trait h−1(x) that they'd match to in the equal marginals case, so they are worse oﬀ. In
terms of assortment, we see that, for the overlap region the result is the same as the equal-marginals case,
while in the remainders we have some of the agents exhibiting PAM or NAM in trait as before (e.g. agents
matching from α to β2), while the surplus agents of α match to β1 agents with converse PAM in surplus trait
and shortage preference only (there is no PAM in shortage trait and surplus preference, as in the perfect
matching stage).
CONTINUOUS MATCHING WITH SINGLE PEAKED PREFERENCES 14
Figure 4.1. Horizontal preferences in the single peaked preference framework.
Figure 4.2. Horizontal matching in the single peaked preference framework
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Figure 4.3. Vertical preferences in the single peaked preference framework.
5.2. Empirical Implications. The empirical implications of this model are also fairly straightforward.
Again, without loss of generality assume a strictly decreasing h and A at the top right, with higher mass on
side A as in ﬁgure 3.5. As a's trait increases, the matching function that gives the distribution of possible
matches exhibits distributions where the maximum preference of matches is equal to a's trait and thus
increasing (β2 in ﬁgure 3.5 is the set of possible matches with preferences less than a's trait). Note that all
potential matches for an A agent with trait x must have the same trait, y, unless their preference is equal
to a's trait, and that this y is decreasing in x. The distribution of possible matches also includes B agents
whose trait is greater than y but less than the minimum preference of a agents with trait x in A', β1 in ﬁgure
3.5. This region's upper and lower bounds in B agent trait decrease in x, while the B agent's preference is
of course increasing in x as it is equal to x. Finally, we can expect a mass point of perfect matches where
preference and trait are reversed from the ﬁrst stage of the matching process. If we only observe trait, we
would expect to see a mass point at the minimum trait a matches to, and as a's trait increases, we would
expect that mass point to move downward.
6. Example Application
6.1. Model Preliminaries. So far we have developed an algorithm for ﬁnding stable matchings, but haven't
used it in any economic application. In this section, we will work through a simple model with a price setting
ﬁrm and compare the results when we assume vertical preferences and when we allow a broader class of single
peaked preferences. Speciﬁcally, we'll consider a two sided market model with a monopolist ﬁrm running a
matching platform and charging a ﬁxed entry fee, and a two sided matching market where agents can either
pay and use the platform to search for matches, getting their perfect information match, or stay oﬀ the
platform and get a ﬁxed expected payoﬀ, normalized to zero, by matching without the information of the
platform. The idea here is to have a stylized model of a ﬁrm that allows agents to choose from a larger set
of matches than can be obtained oﬀ the platform. Another more palatable assumption would be to have oﬀ
platform agents match randomly to other oﬀ platform agents, but this will make solving the model much
more diﬃcult, so for this example we'll proceed with the zero utility outside option.
To make things concrete, suppose agent trait is BMI, and agents uniformly prefer lower BMI's, so that
we can shoehorn this problem into a vertical framework. For analytical ease, assume BMI ranges from 0 to
1, and utility of matching is given by Ua(a, b) = B − θb, where a and b are trait and preference vectors and
θb is the match's trait and B is the beneﬁt of a perfect match. Similarly, we have Ub(a, b) = B− θa. Suppose
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there are uniform distributions of agents of measure 1 over [0,1] on each side. Then agents will match to
their own trait on the platform and, for a price p, the utility of joining the platform Ua(a) = B − θa − p.
6.2. Derivation. The structure of the utility function makes it clear that there will be a cutoﬀ C below
which agents join the platform and above which they refuse, as on-platform utility is decreasing in own trait.
Speciﬁcally, we have equality between joining and not when
0 = B − C − p
=⇒ p = B − C
Assume B<2 so the ﬁrm's strategy isn't a corner solution. Then the ﬁrm wants to maximize
Π(C) = 2(B − C)C
so the ﬁrst order condition is
∂Π
∂C
= 2B − 4C = 0
=⇒ C = B/2
And we have
p = B/2
Π = B2/2
This is clearly an equilibrium of the game, as no consumer would like to deviate from or to the platform, and
the ﬁrm is maximizing proﬁt. To remove unwanted equilibria where, e.g., no one joins the platform, consider
the following equilibrium reﬁnement: we consider only equilibria that can result from all agents joining the
platform, the ﬁrm then setting the price, then agents leaving the platform if their match is worse than the
outside option and forevermore assuming each agent's current strategy will be repeating in future periods.
In this scenario, all agents join, the ﬁrm sets the price derived above, then everyone above the cutoﬀs leaves.
After this step, no one has an incentive to change their strategy.
Now suppose that agents are bivariate uniformly distributed over BMI's from 0 to 1 and over peak
preferences from 0 to L. Suppose also that 2L 5 B 5 2 − 2L. Now we have a nontrivial single peaked
problem. Utility for an A agent is now Ua(a, b) = B − |θb − Pa|. Then agents who enter the platform with
θ < L match to their ideal as fA(θ, P ) = fB(P, θ) for (P, θ) < (L,L). For the remainder, agents match to
their own trait if they join the platform and get utility Ua(a) = B − θa + Pa − p. We will also ﬁnd a cutoﬀ
here, but one that varies in both trait and peak preference:
0 = B − C + P − p
=⇒ C = B − p+ P
so the cutoﬀ is a linear, decreasing function of own preference. Then, for a given price p, the mass of agents
who join the platform on a given side is given by
1
L
ˆ L
0
B − p+ P dP
= (B − p) + L/2
so proﬁt is given by
Π(p) = 2((B − p) + L/2)p
and the ﬁrst order condition for price is
∂Π
∂p
= 2B + L− 4p = 0
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=⇒ B/2 + L/4 = p
We can now compute the following:
C(P ) = B −B/2− L/4 + P
C(P ) = B/2− L/4 + P
Π = 2((B −B/2− L/4) + L/2)(B/2 + L/4)
Π = 2(B/2 + L/4)2)
6.3. Analysis. We can now compare this simple model with and without nontrivial single peaked prefer-
ences. It should be noted that comparing proﬁt, cutoﬀs, and prices is fairly questionable here. We can see
that price and proﬁt increase as the range of peak preferences increase, while the cutoﬀs are also higher on
average. However, this is largely an artifact of the outside option having constant utility for all agents. We
would expect (and solving the same model with an outside option of a random match from the oﬀ platform
agents on the other side conﬁrms) that agents with peak preferences for higher trait (less demanded) matches
get higher expected utility from their random match from the set of oﬀ platform agents, so the higher proﬁts
due to higher match utility for higher peak preference agents is attenuated by the better outside option for
those same agents.
What we can compare is the general structure of the outcomes. In the vertical case we have the standard
assortative-in-trait outcome for agents on the platform, and a cutoﬀ below which the more desirable agents
are willing to pay to ensure they get an equally desirable match, while undesirable agents have less incentive
to join as they wouldn't receive a good match under perfect information. In the nontrivial single-peaked
case, the agents below (L,L) get a perfect match, with converse assortation in all parameters. We also have a
region below a cutoﬀ where agents match assortatively in trait only. However, we see that the cutoﬀ depends
on both trait and preference, so there is no unique cutoﬀ in trait. Agents with a higher peak preference are
willing to accept a higher trait match than their lower peak peers, so we have an intervals over trait where
everyone joins, then fewer and fewer agents of that trait join, and ﬁnal where no one joins. While ﬁnding
closed forms for the cutoﬀs in formulations of this problem with random oﬀ platform matches is diﬃcult
or impossible, they generally exhibit similar qualitative features, with cutoﬀs that vary in peak preference
and regions with converse assortation. It should be noted that the way the cutoﬀs vary in peak preference
don't necessarily conform to the cutoﬀ increasing in peak preference result here, and generally depend on
the functional form of the disutility for more distant matches.
7. Conclusion
This paper derived an algorithm for ﬁnding matching outcomes in a generalization of some environments
that have previously been explored in the matching literature, names Becker's vertical model and Clark's
horizontal model. By allowing for a large range of single peaked distributions, this algorithm can be used
to explore the behavior of matching markets and proﬁt seeking matching platforms under more relaxed
assumptions on preferences, as seen in section 5. An obvious extension of this thread of research is to
explore more theoretical models like the one it section 5. This paper analyzes an intentionally simple model,
with just so distributions that make the math quite simple. It remains to be seen, however, what behavior
would be found in less trivial cases.
There are several other plausible extensions for this model which will not be explored fully in this paper but
may be worth further consideration. For example, other than the restriction placed on preferences, a major
shortcoming of the original homophilic model is that is assumes that agents are able to match perfectly.
This seems quite unrealistic, and prevents analysis of many interesting aspects of matching markets. To
address this, we can retain the homophilic model's structure and add noise to the type signal perceived by
the opposing agents. Aside from dropping the somewhat unpalatable assumption that agents can perfectly
choose from an inﬁnite menu of options, this provides a basis for the exploration of issues involving matching
accuracy. For example, what price can a dating website charge given the quality of its matching service?
What is the welfare loss when matching is not exact? It may also be possible to use this framework to model
adverse selection in dating markets, where instead of a noisy signal individuals observe a reported signal.
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Another useful extension would be to add vertical diﬀerentiation. All of these possibilities involve signiﬁcant
complications, but could be very useful.
Aside from extensions to the baseline model, further study could include determining how these models
relate to analogous ﬁnite matching models or models with search. For example, in a framework where
agents horizontal preferences and have one potential match drawn from the distribution each period and can
accept or reject and wait, and where there is no replacementthat is, as agents match out, the distribution
loses their massas the discount factor goes to 1 the model should asymptotically approach the horizontal
matching outcome described in section 2. The argument, loosely, is that as time discounting goes to zero,
the intervals over which agents are willing to match and their potential match is willing to match to them
asymptotically approach the degenerate interval of their free-choice match. First, the overlap will match
out, and when the the overlap mass approaches zero surplus overlap agents the  amount of time discounting
will become signiﬁcant as the wait time to a match approaches inﬁnity, and surplus agents will ﬁnally accept
their bad matches. Agents in areas where only one distribution has support will match to agents around
their free-choice match from the beginning. Of course, this argument must be formalized. In the case where
there is replacement in the distribution, such that the distribution is constant across time, all agents in the
intersection of the supports will match to an interval asymptotically approaching their own type since there
will always be a chance of getting a near perfect match bounded above zero, and agents outside the support
intersection will match outward, with the negative assortment seen before for the remainder distributions.
This too requires formalization.
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